Short:
We are OK, but it's tight.
Owners can cover 90M of PSR costs over the three year period.
Sales of homegrown talents is a very effective way of avoiding falling foul of PSR - we sold Greenwood, McT, Kambwala and Hannibal for a combined 70M, and Wan Bissaka, whose transfer fee has been covered by previous years, was sold for 17.5M. Unlike player sales, which is income, purchases are assets and amortised over the length of their contracts. Which means that spending 200M (with wages) over 5 years equals 40M for this year, while the sales generated at least 87.5M (although unsure how AWB would impact PSR in this case).
There are substantial cost deductions given for investments in women's football, infrastructure and academy.
Cuts galore is helping.
The details:
Basically because of all the reasons mentioned in the above part. The reported "net loss" on the balance sheet has very little to do with PSR. Ultimately it is the adjusted loss, wirh deductions included, that matter.
The rules are that you can not lose more than 15M. If you do, you have to prove that you have the equity investments to cover any loses above that. As mentioned that allowance is 90M, which means that the hard cap for PSR is 105M.
However PSR isn't intented to prevent investments in the future of football, quite the opposite, so they award deductions for:
2024: 55.1
2023: 42.1
2022: 34
Which totals 131.1M. However they were also allowed a 40M COVID allowance for 2022 - which ends up with 91.5M, which is within the limits.
The big risk of course is 2025 with these numbers. Before we move on, it is important to know that PSR is calculated on a season basis ie June to June. So July 2024 and January 2025 is part of the same "year".
Based on 2023 and 2024 numbers, we can have adjusted losses of only 7.8M to be in compliance. Unless the financial cost of the strategic review is given an exception, which it might be - then we could be looking at 54M. That is a bit of a risky gamble though.
This is where Ratcliffe cost saving comes in. In the first three month period Man Utd had losses totalling 349k as opposed to 8.5M last September (July August, September). This includes our summer window.
Amorim could surprise us and win Europa, then suddenly we are making healthy profits. However the cost reduction has been intense, so I wouldn't put it past them to manage the 90% reduction they seem to be aiming for as a minimum, even without winning Europa. Which leaves us with an adjusted loss of 5.5M
Which means we have an entire 2.2M to work with - or 46.2 MAYBE if the strategic review recives an exception. Which admittedly is not a lot of wiggle room. It would certainly help a lot to sell Rashford and replace him with a player you can spread the cost on.
Now say we sell Rashford for 40M, and buy Osimhen for 65M. Rashford would be pure profit for this season - 40M, while Osimhen would be 13M on our books this year. Instead of 2.2M, we have space for 29M. The same would be true for profits from any other academy graduates (based on fees obviously). We don't have to sell anyone, but we definitely need to do so to buy. It would also probably benefit the squad and it would give us a bit more breathing room in terms of PSR.
Q2 reports usually arrive in March, so we will have a much better picture then of how PSR will shake out for 2025. In addition to knowing what business was done in January and how our season is progressing.
We are OK, but it's tight.
Owners can cover 90M of PSR costs over the three year period.
Sales of homegrown talents is a very effective way of avoiding falling foul of PSR - we sold Greenwood, McT, Kambwala and Hannibal for a combined 70M, and Wan Bissaka, whose transfer fee has been covered by previous years, was sold for 17.5M. Unlike player sales, which is income, purchases are assets and amortised over the length of their contracts. Which means that spending 200M (with wages) over 5 years equals 40M for this year, while the sales generated at least 87.5M (although unsure how AWB would impact PSR in this case).
There are substantial cost deductions given for investments in women's football, infrastructure and academy.
Cuts galore is helping.
The details:
Basically because of all the reasons mentioned in the above part. The reported "net loss" on the balance sheet has very little to do with PSR. Ultimately it is the adjusted loss, wirh deductions included, that matter.
The rules are that you can not lose more than 15M. If you do, you have to prove that you have the equity investments to cover any loses above that. As mentioned that allowance is 90M, which means that the hard cap for PSR is 105M.
However PSR isn't intented to prevent investments in the future of football, quite the opposite, so they award deductions for:
- The depreciation of tangible fixed assets or amortisation/impairment of intangible assets.
- Women’s football expenditure.
- Youth development expenditure.
- Community development expenditure.
2024: 55.1
2023: 42.1
2022: 34
Which totals 131.1M. However they were also allowed a 40M COVID allowance for 2022 - which ends up with 91.5M, which is within the limits.
The big risk of course is 2025 with these numbers. Before we move on, it is important to know that PSR is calculated on a season basis ie June to June. So July 2024 and January 2025 is part of the same "year".
Based on 2023 and 2024 numbers, we can have adjusted losses of only 7.8M to be in compliance. Unless the financial cost of the strategic review is given an exception, which it might be - then we could be looking at 54M. That is a bit of a risky gamble though.
This is where Ratcliffe cost saving comes in. In the first three month period Man Utd had losses totalling 349k as opposed to 8.5M last September (July August, September). This includes our summer window.
Amorim could surprise us and win Europa, then suddenly we are making healthy profits. However the cost reduction has been intense, so I wouldn't put it past them to manage the 90% reduction they seem to be aiming for as a minimum, even without winning Europa. Which leaves us with an adjusted loss of 5.5M
Which means we have an entire 2.2M to work with - or 46.2 MAYBE if the strategic review recives an exception. Which admittedly is not a lot of wiggle room. It would certainly help a lot to sell Rashford and replace him with a player you can spread the cost on.
Now say we sell Rashford for 40M, and buy Osimhen for 65M. Rashford would be pure profit for this season - 40M, while Osimhen would be 13M on our books this year. Instead of 2.2M, we have space for 29M. The same would be true for profits from any other academy graduates (based on fees obviously). We don't have to sell anyone, but we definitely need to do so to buy. It would also probably benefit the squad and it would give us a bit more breathing room in terms of PSR.
Q2 reports usually arrive in March, so we will have a much better picture then of how PSR will shake out for 2025. In addition to knowing what business was done in January and how our season is progressing.
Et selles osakonnas on suht pupu, küll aga tõesti kui me suudaks mingit kasumit* müügiga tekitada, siis me saaks väga kiiresti seda osakonda tasandada. Kõige rohkem aitaks kui me suudaks mõne omakasvandiku/akadeemia mängija müügist mingit päris kasumit saada. Ma ei oska öelda kuidas ja miks me pääsesime päris miinus punktidest nagu Forest ja Everton said, aga meil õnnestus veel. Tulevikus enam ilmselt mitte, kui sama halb olukord jätkuks. 
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